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I. Introduction
For three decades, Lyman Johnson and David Millon have
stood for the proposition that corporate law should concern itself
with social welfare.1 They have done so with commitment,
analytical skill, and rhetorical facility, seeking to preserve an
institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates
them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. They
first intervened during the late 1980s, a time when corporate legal
institutions and market forces came to blows over questions
concerning hostile takeovers.2 At the time it seemed like the
* Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for
Law & Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Research Associate,
European Corporate Governance Institute.
1. See David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373,
1374 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, New Directions] (addressing balance between
shareholder and non-shareholder constituencies); Lyman P. Q. Johnson, New
Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1713–14 (1993)
(discussing limitations on shareholder primacy).
2. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 224
(1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law] (discussing hostile
takeover crisis).
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institutions had won, with Johnson and Millon striving to add
protective depth to the outcome by advocating for inclusion of
constituent interests as beneficiaries in the corporation’s legal
model.3 But a different picture has emerged as the years have gone
by. It is now clear that the market side really won the battle of the
1980s, succeeding in entering a wedge between corporate law and
social welfare.4 The distance between the Johnson and Millon’s
welfarist enterprise and its corporate law target has been widening
ever since.
This Essay is a meditation on that widening gulf. It will
compare the vision of the corporation and of the role it plays in
society that prevailed during the immediate post-war era, before
the fulcrum years of the 1980s, with the very different vision we
have today, and trace the path we took from there to here. It will
close with a brief prediction regarding corporate law’s future.
II. The Post-War Corporation
The post-war writings of Adolf Berle provide a lens that brings
into focus a lost vision of a welfarist corporation. Berle described
an “American economic republic,” a sort of latter-day
constitutional settlement directed to production and employment.5
Although Berle is remembered for having problematized corporate
power in a famous book published in 1932, for most of his career
he stood for the opposite proposition.6 There was no inconsistency,
for, in Berle’s view, the New Deal had changed everything,

3. See Millon, New Directions, supra note 1, at 1374 (discussing shareholder
primacy); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1714 (addressing shareholder constituencies);
Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 223–27 (discussing director’s
duties to shareholders); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 878–88 (1990)
(discussing focus on shareholder accountability).
4. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 677 (2010) (discussing the
1980s fueling market oriented corporate governance).
5. See ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 81–82 (1963)
[hereinafter BERLE, REPUBLIC] (discussing the role of competitive markets in the
American economy).
6. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932).
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bequeathing a political economy in which corporate power had
been rendered benign:
The 1929 crash, the slow recovery of 1930, and the ensuing
spiral descent into an abyss of unemployment, bank failures,
and commercial paralysis was not corrected by market
processes. The contemporary business captains, working
desperately (as they did) to meet the situation, failed
completely. Following established precepts of the American
political process, the public . . . increasingly asked that the
political state propose a program and act. Necessarily, this
meant considerable reorganization of private business . . . . Out
of the crisis was born the American economic republic as we
know it today.7

In Berle’s new republic, the state and the economy were
interdependent, with the state taking ultimate responsibility for
economic results and exercising the higher level of power.8 The old
economic order, with its private property and profit maximization
engine, persisted9 and, incentivized by the profit motive, did the
producing.10 The state had intervened only to stabilize its
organizational lines and performance.11 More extensive
government intervention had been avoided, but only because
sophisticated private actors had learned to moderate their
conduct.12 They had seen that the state’s regulatory power took
precedence over their own economic power, and accordingly had
restrained the exercise of their power for the sake of its own
preservation.13 This permitted the state to exercise its economic
power only negatively, rarely resorting to direct insistence on
positive action.14
7. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 91.
8. See id. at 95, 99, 169 (addressing the formation of new government
institutions to provide “economic ‘guide lines’”).
9. See id. at 99 (“It[, the modified order,] maintained the institution of
private property and wealth.”).
10. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE,
POWER] (recognizing that government regulation of corporations assumes profit
will incentivize production, supply, and distribution).
11. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 99 (suggesting a new system
emerged from the “emergency base wrought in 1933”).
12. See id. at 169 (noting the lack of instruments like courts and tribunals).
13. See id. (“Economic power is secondary to political power.”).
14. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 94 (“Most, though by no means all,
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Two factors were responsible for this healthy equilibrium:
first, government management of the economy from an
unchallenged position of higher authority and, second, a solid
supporting political consensus.15 The public consensus in turn
depended on corporate performance—price stability, jobs, and
benefits.16 The voters had learned during the Depression that they
did not want a perpetual struggle in a free market context.17
Instead they wanted economic growth, distribution of its benefits
to substantially all, and full employment.18 They also wanted
predictability without halts and starts, both as to employment and
the prices of goods and services.19 The interest groups—big
business, small business, labor, and farmers—all were in accord,
along with the majority of both political parties.20 Nothing in the
post war era had changed those preferences.21 Nor was a future
change foreseeable.22
Berle described a benign equipoise amongst strong
organizations, an equipoise constrained by a wider public
consensus that empowered the central government in the role of
welfare maximizer—he saw a state that guided and pushed
markets to the right result with the cooperative engagement of
interested parties.23 Managers were caught inside a web of
countervailing powers and had no way to get out of control. The
strands in the web were product market price competition, labor
governmental power is negatively exercised: it takes the form of prohibiting
certain uses of economic power by non-Statist organizations.”).
15. See id. at 120–22 (discussing increased production demands and need for
continuity).
16. See id. at 122 (discussing desire for stability in labor market).
17. See id. (addressing fear of economic downturns).
18. See id. (discussing desire for “full employment”).
19. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 50–
51 (1954) [hereinafter BERLE, 20TH CENTURY] (discussing price stabilization in
commodity markets).
20. See id. at 50 (“Obstinately, however, big business and small business,
farmers and laborers, corporations which like their profit margins and labor
unions which like their jobs, controlling majorities in the Republican as well as
the Democratic parties, decline to acknowledge the error of their ways.”).
21. See id. (discussing maintenance of price stabilization under President
Eisenhower).
22. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 99 (“There appears no present
likelihood that a new basis will be sought in the foreseeable future.”).
23. See id. at 88 (discussing the role of the democratic process in change).
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unions, trade associations, public opinion, management’s own
sense of responsibility, and most importantly, government
regulation.24
Managers emerged as quasi-public servants.25 Whether they
liked it or not, they were caught between the regulatory state and
the public consensus.26 Failure to satisfy the public meant new
regulation; avoidance of new regulation meant satisfying the
public.27 So public duties could not, as a practical matter, be
avoided, and managers emerged playing a role as economic and
social allocators, actively assuming public functions.28
Changes on the ground backed Berle’s vision. During the
1950s in the United States, while other countries were instituting
national health systems and generous state pension schemes for
senior citizens, the corporations took on the great part of the
welfare burden.29 This was in part an accident of history—pensions
and medical benefits found their way into a high-profile settlement
between General Motors and its unions in 1948, a settlement that
was copied across the industrial landscape and modified over time
to labor’s advantage as industries went from settlement to
settlement.30
Those years were—not coincidentally—the golden age of
American management. Commentators described a new economy
that had evolved past Adam Smith’s atomistic free market strivers
so that forward motion came from innovative technocrats in
management suites.31 Shareholders dropped out of this governance
picture. Berle explained why; all they did was passively collect

24. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 53–59 (discussing obstacles
of manager control).
25. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 8 (“Since they are not owners but
only managers, they really are a variety of non-Statist civil servant.”).
26. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 59, 172–73 (discussing
demands from public and government)
27. See id. at 59, 172–73 (discussing limited choices of managers).
28. See id. at 59, 175 (examining the rationale for corporate donations to
educational institutions).
29. GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING
THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 42 (2016).
30. Id.
31. See Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of “Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1,
3, 10 (1958) (addressing the role of managers in the rise of large corporations).
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dividends and then consume or save.32 As such, shareholders
played no productive role in the economy. Stock market controls,
seen today as the cutting edge of discipline and productive
efficiency, were then thought to be largely irrelevant. Corporations
in need of capital retained earnings or borrowed.33 The function of
the stock market was to hold out liquidity for the benefit of the rich
grandchildren of the entrepreneurs who had founded the great
companies. Monitoring had gravitated over to the hands of
government authorities,34 which mediated between producing
companies and the markets. The shareholder franchise was
likewise irrelevant, the annual vote for the board of directors
having degenerated into a meaningless ritual.35
As rich consumers, shareholders did play a role in social
welfare enhancement as providers. They supported their families,
they supported social welfare programs as taxpayers, and they
supported charities as donors.36 As such, they were entitled to
society’s thanks, but not its political solicitude. The shareholder
interest would emerge as a legitimate force in society, said Berle,
only when shareholder wealth was so widely distributed as to
benefit every American family.37 Only in such a distributive utopia
could the shareholder interest serve as a proxy for social welfare
and thus hold out political economic salience.
Interestingly, there was not much in the way of discussion of
corporate social responsibility in post-war Berle. Regulation and
32. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 31–32 (arguing that no
enterprise with so many members work absent a centralized command).
33. See id. at 36–37 (noting that during the preceding six years 64% of
invested capital had been financed by retained earnings and only 6% from new
equity); see also BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that 10–15% percent
of new capital came from pension funds and insurance companies and 20% from
bank borrowing).
34. See Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the
Revised Edition of ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxvii, xxxiii (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968)
(1932) [hereinafter BERLE, 1967 INTRODUCTION] (discussing the rise of government
intervention).
35. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 104–05 (identifying Board of
Directors elections as “not an impressive ritual”).
36. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 51–52 (discussing welfare by the
state and community).
37. See BERLE, 1967 INTRODUCTION, supra note 34, at xxxv (balancing
shareholder interests and wealth inequality).
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ancillary government pressure took care of externalities (or so he
thought). The economy was growing, the constituents were
content, and managers were seen as under control.38 Nor did Berle
problematize compliance with law, for his managers proceeded
decorously when dealing with the powerful post-New Deal state.
III. Conflict and Resolution, 1970–1990
Conflicts did simmer under the surface. They became manifest
during the 1970s and played themselves out during the 1980s,
posing a multi-sided and ultimately successful challenge to Berle’s
American economic republic. This was the era during which
corporate social responsibility and constituent rights came to the
forefront of corporate policy debates, social responsibility in the
1970s and constituencies in the 1980s, negating Berle’s vision of a
satisfied public. Simultaneously, shareholder value maximization
rose to prominence to pose a countervailing vision of the
corporation’s place in society, a vision that focused on the market
as opposed to government controls, and negated Berle’s vision of a
benevolent state maximizer. A resolution followed: the shareholder
vision won. Social responsibility would not be imposed on
companies and constituents would get no rights, and, indeed,
would see their positions deteriorate considerably even as the
shareholder interest gained influence.
The economic background was unstable during the early part
of this period—the economic bill for the Vietnam War came due in
1972 and 1973, when the stock market collapsed and the economy
went into a severe recession aggravated by the mid-east oil crisis.39
The stock market did not really recover until August of 1982—a
whole decade in which there was no money to be made long in
stocks even as inflation rose steeply. The malaise was called
“stagflation” and undermined the economic assumptions of the
managerial golden age.40 The appearance of international
competition in manufactured goods added to the stock of chronic

38. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 120–22 (discussing production
demands and content constituencies).
39. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 47.
40. Id. at 55.
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problems.41 We were no longer a closed continental economy in
which domestic corporations competed only against one another.
People started to ask questions about how well managers were
doing their jobs,42 questions that began with the sudden collapse
of the once great Penn Central Railroad in 197043 and intensified
as bad results accumulated.
At the same time, the old New Deal political coalition that
created and maintained the strong regulatory state fell apart.
Managers, formerly co-operative in the face of overwhelming state
power, defected, and started to play a hostile game against
regulatory initiatives. Simply, they were no longer afraid of
non-compliance.44 Deregulation also started in the 1970s, and
picked up speed after 1980. Deregulation, however, meant removal
of an existing regime only in a handful of industries.45 For the most
part, deregulation meant not repeal but inaction—we just left
things the way they were, even as corporate risk taking and
externalization pursued new paths.
The conceptual framework surrounding corporations changed
substantially as a result. Unbridled management power,
problematized by Berle back in 1932, came back to the forefront as
the problem in need of solution.46 Corporate governance was
invented to take care of the job. The phrase “corporate governance”
had its first published appearance only in 1972.47 The first fully
developed text on the subject, Melvin Eisenberg’s book, The
41. Id. at 55–56.
42. Id. at 56.
43. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N TO THE SPECIAL S.
COMM. OF INVESTIGATIONS, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY (1972) (discussing the fall of the Penn Central Railroad).
44. See Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity, Reforming
the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA
L. REV. 343, 347–48 (1981) (describing corporate noncooperation, such as court
challenges and minimum legal compliance).
45. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a
Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 628–30 (2007) (noting the regulation
of specific “individual industries” had already replaced the breadth of New Deal
regulations).
46. See id. at 630 (discussing the impact of deregulation on manager power).
47. See Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession 13 (John
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford, Working Paper No. 470, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491088 (“[T]he New York Times featured the phrase
as early as 1972 . . . .”).
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Structure of the Corporation,48 followed quickly in 1976. Eisenberg
synthesized and materially advanced a generation of thinking
about deficiencies of the received legal model of the corporation.49
For a corrective mechanism, he turned to the moribund board of
directors.50 If we scaled down the demands we placed on a board of
directors and successfully required it to monitor management
performance (as opposed to taking a leadership role in hands on
management), corporate performance would improve.51 This
monitoring function in turn required independent directors and a
committee structure keyed to monitoring functions.52 All of a
sudden there was something that could be done about corporations
and “corporate governance” held the key, with best practices as the
focus of the new mode of discussion. Expectations ran high, higher
than a bland list of best practices would seem to justify. “Corporate
governance” held out something for everybody.
The political left, which did not disappear quietly, grabbed
hold of it first. Progressives, who in the 1970s still considered
themselves the country’s natural ruling group, had become
manifestly frustrated—they were dissatisfied with the level of new
regulation and outraged by corporate non-co-operation even as
they despaired of marshalling political backing for new
initiatives.53 The American corporate social responsibility
movement arose as a result, and its policy entrepreneurs looked to
governance institutions for reform platforms.54 Director
“independence,” they thought, could import corporate social
responsibility.55 Maybe we could require corporations to nominate
48. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1976). Eisenberg’s monitoring model of the board of directors has ever
since been the main focus of legal corporate governance.
49. See generally id. (discussing additional rules and structure for corporate
governance).
50. See id. at 139–85 (discussing additional structure for board of directors
and management).
51. See id. at 156–57 (discussing the function of the board of directors).
52. See id. (emphasizing the monitoring function of the board).
53. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 597 (1982) (describing dissatisfaction
with the current corporate regulatory regime).
54. See id. (discussing calls for reform).
55. See id. at 603–04 (noting a renewed focus on Berle’s concerns regarding
outside directors).
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their directors from a centrally qualified list, with all persons
admitted to the list being sound progressive types.56 Maybe we
could use the proxy system to tap into popular protest of
irresponsible corporate policies.57 Maybe corporate law could be
federalized and charter competition choked off, with the right sort
of people cranking out new duties and reporting obligations.58
None of this came to much. The political traction was not
there, for, even as anti-corporate sentiment was gaining more
political salience, the emerging political economic equilibrium was
taking a regressive turn. A new outlet appeared to channel and
partially appease this negative sentiment—not taxation, not
redistribution, not a stable environment for working families, not
progressive capture of corporate governance institutions, but
compliance with law for its own sake. The watershed event was the
foreign bribes scandal incident to the Watergate investigations,
which resulted in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.59
Much like New Deal initiatives, this intervention leaned on
corporations to get them in line with the public program. But, as
befits new regulation in a deregulatory era, it did not much
implicate the economic substance of corporate management even
as it constrained management power. Where in Berle’s day the
regulatory objective was cooperative corporate participation in a
national effort to enhance social welfare, now we had a narrower,
simpler objective: to the extent we do have regulation, comply with
it. Significantly, corporate governance mechanisms were pressed
into the service of the new compliance goal, a practice that would
proliferate in regulation generally as the command and control
approach yielded to self-regulatory initiatives.
56. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 426–32 (discussing the composition of board
of directors).
57. In 1970, a group of public interest lawyers launched a proxy contest at
GM in an attempt to elect three progressives to the board of directors. “Campaign
GM” received three percent of the votes. See Donald E. Schwartz, Proxy Power
and Social Goals: How Campaign GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 764, 764–
66 (2012) (discussing the GM proxy campaign).
58. See NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 16 (1976) (discussing
the great size and power of large corporations on a national level); Donald E.
Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 548–49
(1984) (discussing federal regulation of corporate governance).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff (2012) (demonstrating an
increased effort to regulate corporate practices globally).
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For a time, managers felt threatened. They turned to the same
focal point as did everyone else—corporate governance—and tried
to capture it for themselves. The Business Roundtable, seeking to
stave off more intrusive initiatives, publicly embraced the
independent director majority.60 So long as incumbent CEOs could
use their influence to secure appointment of cooperative types, any
threat was minimal.61 Cooperative engagement did not last long in
any event. Once the political climate changed and the threat
receded, management went back into opposition, fighting tooth
and nail when the American Law Institute geared up to propose
best practices mandates in the 1980s.62
There would, however, be no letup in the governance-based
assaults on management prerogatives. But the source of pressure
changed when the shareholders themselves emerged in the 1980s
to take their own place at the new corporate governance table and
replace progressives as normative entrepreneurs.
As we turn our attention to the shareholders, reference must
be made to another fundamental text dating from the 1970s, the
famous paper of Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Agency
Costs and the Theory of the Firm, published in 1976.63 This coined
another new term, “agency costs,” which would come into usage in
tandem with “corporate governance,” with very different
implications from those attached by 1970s progressives.64 Jensen
and Meckling for the first time brought microeconomic analysis to
the study of interior corporate arrangements, confirming the
suggestion that corporate governance mattered for productivity.65
60. See Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2085, 2089, 2093
(1978) (proposing reforms to encourage more independent directors).
61. See Brudney, supra note 53, at 610–12 (describing the pattern of
cooperation and management control of appointments).
62. See Victor Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its
Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 228 (1983) (opposing increased government
regulation of board structure).
63. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
64. See id. at 308 (“We define agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the
residual loss.”).
65. See id. at 309 (“We show below that an explanation of why and how the
agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the
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But there is a critical point of distinction between Jensen and
Meckling’s vision and the vision of reformers like Eisenberg.
Jensen and Meckling are the theoretical starting point for the
assertions that the purpose of the corporation is shareholder value
maximization and that market forces by themselves can discipline
managers effectively—a different and radical reversal of the
assumptions that underlay the Berle’s American economic
republic.66 There was also a corollary proposition: if anything
impeded the forces of market control, it followed that agency costs
were excessive.67
The market control scenario unfolded for real during the
takeover wars of the 1980s.68 The markets, suppressed in the
course of the New Deal settlement, came back to retake the
forward role in corporate governance, a position that has been
steadily solidifying ever since.69 Market control and shareholder
value maximization operate in tandem. Indeed, they are two sides
of the same coin.70
ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.”).
66. See id. at 313 (“Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the
owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs, hence the price
which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of
the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs.”).
67. See id. at 352 (“If the costs of reducing the dispersion of ownership are
lower than the benefits to be obtained from reducing the agency costs, it will pay
some individual or group of individuals to buy shares in the market to reduce the
dispersion of ownership.”).
68. See Scheherazade S. Rehman, Can Financial Institutional Investors
Legally Safeguard American Stockholders?, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 683, 701 (2006)
(“In the 1980s, takeovers (friendly and hostile) radically changed the landscape
of the U.S. economy.”).
69. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 676 (“[M]anagers emerged from
the 1980s sensitized to the benefits of shareholder-value maximization even as
the board of directors emerged as a more robust monitoring institution. Hostile
takeovers lost their place at the cutting edge of corporate governance as a
result.”).
70. See id. at 667
[S]hareholder proponents contemplate a species of market control.
They want the market price—which is, after all, set by shareholders
investing at the margin—to be the ongoing and determining source of
shareholder input. It bids those managers who are effective agents to
manage to the stock market in formulating business policy, thereby
accessing the high-quality instructions embedded in stock market
prices. With the market price as the management yardstick,
value-enhancing opportunities to merge, sell, or dissolve will no longer
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Numerous factors combined to effect the change. Reagan came
in and the left was marginalized.71 Antitrust policies that inhibited
same industry mergers were abandoned.72 Labor unions markedly
declined in influence.73 Competition from abroad intensified. As
the junk bond became available, ideas about acceptable levels of
leverage changed markedly so that high leverage became a means
to facilitate corporate control transfers.74 The prime targets were
the most extreme product of post-war managerialism,
conglomerate structures, which had come to be seen as
dysfunctional, for the stock market systematically undervalued
their businesses.75
The struggle’s end point is familiar enough. Leveraged
restructuring roared through the economy before the takeovers
finally stopped. The stoppage was the ostensible result of
collaboration between managers and state lawmakers to deter
takeovers with legal barriers.76 But economic factors also figured
in—one recalls a severe recession and tight money, along with
changes in asset prices. Whatever the reason for the stoppage, the
hostile takeover would never again matter all that much.
Meanwhile, thinking about corporations once again shifted
fundamentally. Maximization of shareholder value came in as the
objective to be achieved.77 Managers, once seen as effective
be frustrated by the managers’ desire to hold on to control; resources
will no longer be misdirected to suboptimal executive compensation
plans; and governance arrangements will import appropriate
constraints and incentives. Managing to the market price also is
thought to import administrative coherence, because the yardstick
provides a means with which to evaluate management performance.
71. See Terry Carter, Should This Toy be Saved?, 99 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (2013)
(“Then Ronald Reagan became president in 1981 with a mission to shrink
government and lighten the regulatory load on business.”).
72. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 53–54.
73. Id. at 65–66.
74. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (2013) (“By the mid-to late 1980s, more than half of
all junk bond issuances were related to acquisitions.”).
75. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 54–59.
76. See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover
Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1542
(1991) (“The desire by both management and state legislators to curb hostile
takeovers placed the courts in a difficult dilemma.”).
77. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
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technocrats, now become incentive incompatible actors whose
greed and incompetence choked the economy with chronic,
out-of-control agency costs. Management empowerment
accordingly remained as the salient policy problem, not because it
resulted in externalities but because it left shareholders with
suboptimal yields.78 Indeed, shareholders emerged as a permanent
aggrieved class with an unmet regulatory entitlement.79 The longstanding but vague association between corporate purpose and
social welfare dropped out of the picture.
IV. The Post-Takeover Era
There was a lot of carnage in the transition from the social
corporation of the American economic republic to today’s
shareholder corporation. In the leveraged restructurings of the
1980s, a couple of generations of corporate employees, who had
justifiably expected that their companies held out careers, lost
their jobs.80 Billions of dollars of wealth shifted as their human
capital investments were sacrificed in order to enhance
shareholder value. As a result, constituent concerns displaced
more general concerns about social responsibility at the forefront
of progressive critique of the operation of corporate law, with
Lyman Johnson and David Millon at the discussion’s forefront.81
There was even a law reform movement—a succession of bills was
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the
firm’s equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives
to maximize the value of the firm.”).
78. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 659 (“If managers
misunderstood the quantum of risks they were taking, then shareholders with
more limited access to the relevant information certainly were no better informed
and accordingly had no role to play in preventing externalization.”).
79. See id. at 665–73 (“Shareholder empowerment emerged from the
takeover era as the leading issue in corporate law, with a consistent consensus in
its favor.”).
80. See Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors and the “Social Costs” of
Takeovers—Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1989) (“During
1984 and the first half of 1985, an estimated 550,000 employees’ jobs were affected
by takeover-related restructuring decisions.”).
81. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that Johnson and
Millon advocated for inclusion of constituent interests as beneficiaries in the
corporation’s legal model).
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introduced in Washington to ameliorate the dislocation
experienced by the subject employees.82 None were enacted and the
initiative faded away during the 1990s.83 Henceforth, the corporate
law case for the employees’ interests would be tied to the case for
management
empowerment vis-à-vis
shareholders,
and
84
subordinated thereto.
The job losses did not stop with the restructurings of the
1980s. America’s large corporations have been steadily lightening
their payrolls ever since. Manufacturing is outsourced wherever
possible, usually abroad.85 The change is pervasive. The greatest
corporate successes of the present age are in the computer and
electronics and telecommunications industries. Even so,
employment in these sectors has dropped dramatically since
2000.86 Today’s most successful companies are Apple, which
employs 92,000 (half of them in the stores), and Google, which
82. See Alan E. Garfield, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction:
Corporate Takeovers and the Politics of Worker Dislocation, 16 J. CORP. L. 249,
273 (1991) (“By comparison to the frenetic lawmaking by the states, the federal
response to takeover dislocation has been all talk and no action. Numerous
congressional committees have held hearings on the issue, but no significant
legislation has been enacted to address the problem.”).
83. Below is a tabulation of bills introduced in Congress relating to
corporations from 1987 to 2004, the “plant closing” category shows no activity
after 1998:

Hostile
Takeover
Other
Merger
Foreign
Acquisition

Industry
Specific
Plant
Closing

1987
1988
20

1989
1990
12

1991
1992
4

1993
1994
3

1995
1996
0

1997
1998
1

1999
2000
0

2001
2002
0

2003
2004
0

11

3

5

0

2

2

7

4

3

6

4

6

1

1

0

0

0

0

13

16

2

3

8

7

12

10

0

3

0

3

0

2

0

0

0

0

84. This is the contribution of Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
85. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 69–79.
86. Id. at 15.
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employs 54,000.87 Facebook, which makes sense as number three,
employs 12,500.88 The employment numbers fall off drastically at
other successful tech companies.89 General Motors, the most
successful of mid-twentieth century corporations, employed
850,000 at its peak in the 1980s.90
Simply, big corporations have lost their position as the focal
point of the lives of most Americans. In the management golden
age, corporations were the places where talented people made
careers. Restructuring put an end to that. Now, instead of careers,
we have jobs. And it is looking like jobs are disappearing as well—
there is shift away from jobs and employers to tasks and piecework
contracts.91 In the golden age, big corporations handled the
accumulation of retirement savings. They stopped doing that too,
as employers shifted from defined benefit pension plans to defined
contribution plans.92 In the golden age, big corporations took care
of medical benefits for most Americans. But that burden
eventually ripened into a competitive disadvantage as regards
companies in countries that chose to put government welfare
schemes in place instead.93
None of this registers in today’s corporate law policy
discussions. Downsizing and asset-lite business plans enhance
return on equity for the shareholders’ benefit—end of discussion.
The trade-offs of the 1980s have been forgotten without there ever
having been a discussion of the cost-benefit question they posed:
whether the toll of human capital taken together with the ancillary
costs of over-leverage and resulting bankruptcy might have
outweighed the shareholder benefits. The best account of the era
87.
88.

Id. at 147.
See Number of Facebook Employees from 2004 to 2016 (Full Time),
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273563/number-of-facebookemployees/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (noting that as of December 2015 Facebook
had 12,691 people under full-time employment).
89. See DAVIS, supra note 29, at xv (“At this writing, the combined global
workforces of Facebook, Yelp, Zynga, LinkedIn, Zillow, Tableau, Zulily, and Box
are smaller than the number of people who lost their jobs when Circuit City was
liquidated in 2009.”).
90. See id. at 15 (providing a chart showing the number of people employed
at General Motors from 1923 to 2009).
91. Id. at 144–49.
92. Id. at 120–21.
93. Id. at 119–21.

THE SEPARATION OF CORPORATE LAW

783

characterizes the overleverage as a cost-beneficial external shock
that redirected the management’s incentives in the right,
shareholder-oriented direction.94 The human capital sacrifice
matters not at all—it is a mere incident of capitalism at its most
dynamic.
American society has been adjusting ever since to increased
instability, decreased opportunity, and widening inequality. Such
is the prestige of markets that few perceive this to be a problem.
Meanwhile, management, which tried and failed to capture the
newly important corporate governance system, has itself been
captured in turn. During the golden age, managers took it out as
salary under what today would look like egalitarian pay
structures.95 Now managers take it out in equity compensation
arrangements that tie their fortunes to the stock price.96 For all
their complaining, they got with the program, and did well.
Shareholder advocates have two modes of coping with this
dark side.97 First, they assume that shareholder wealth
maximization and social welfare maximization are more or less the
same thing.98 Second, even if shareholder wealth maximization
does not by itself enhance social welfare as a theoretical matter, it
does so as a practical matter because most Americans now hold
shares.99 Let us take up these claims in turn.
94. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 122–23 (“Thanks to lucrative stock option plans,
managers could share in the market returns from restructured companies.
Shareholder value became an ally rather than an enemy.”).
95. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 131–34.
96. See Matthew A. Mellone, The Section 83(b) Election and the Fallacy of
“Earned Income”, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 53, 54 (2013) (“The putative benefits of
equity compensation arrangements are imbedded in the stock price at the time of
grant.”).
97. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders
and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013) (describing both modes of
the theory that shareholder maximization and social welfare maximization are
linked).
98. See generally id. (“Under this theory, shareholder wealth maximization,
it seems, is a key that unlocks the door to making the world a better place.”).
99. See id. at 489–90 (“[T]he quest for political solicitude has made the jump
from theory to practice: a ‘shareholder class’ is said to have risen in our political
economy as an offshoot of the growth of stock ownership among the middle class.
Thus, real-world shareholders again are seen to bear on social welfare.”).
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The first claim posits that shareholder value maximization
and social welfare maximization are synonymous, or, at least that
shareholder value is a robust proxy for social welfare.100 This is
inexcusably bad economics.101 To see why, one needs to go back to
theoretical square one, the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics.102 This begins with a general equilibrium view of the
economy and assumes away externalities103 to pose that a
competitive economy maximizes wealth.104 The normative kicker is
that everything that can be done to make the economy more
competitive should be done so that the economy reaches a Pareto
optimal production possibility frontier, the point of economic
efficiency.105 Once we reach the frontier, we encounter the second
fundamental theorem, which introduces social welfare. This
theorem holds that, given an efficient economy, preferences for
redistribution can be dealt with through lump sum taxes and
transfers, provided that the transfers do nothing to impair the
incentives that got us to the efficient frontier in the first place. 106
Things get tricky at this point because it is very likely that taxes
and transfers will impair productive incentives, which in turn
implies a policy against redistribution. Happily, the theory of the
100. See id. at 498 (“[A] related question can be asked: whether shareholder
value maximization legitimately can be characterized as a ‘proxy’ for social
welfare maximization.”).
101. See id. at 497 (“From the point of view of economic theory, ‘social welfare’
does not necessarily enter into this discussion, which concerns only the creation
of wealth.”).
102. See id. at 498 (“The exercise directly extends the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics. Strictly speaking, it provides a basis for describing
shareholder value maximization as wealth maximization, but not as social
welfare maximization.”).
103. All individuals and firms are price takers, each firm produces so as to
maximize its profits subject to a production constraint, and each individual
consumes so as to maximize individual utility. See generally Allan M. Feldman,
Welfare Economics, in 8 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
104. Id. at 723.
105. See William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J.
CORP. L. 713, 715 (2014) (describing the first and second fundamental theorems
of welfare economics).
106. More particularly, given the outcome of the first theorem, almost any
Pareto optimal equilibrium can be achieved given imposition of appropriate taxes
and transfers. See Feldman, supra note 103, at 724 (examining the necessary
wealth-redistributive effects for optimal social welfare).
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second best comes to the rescue, posing that taxes and transfers
can make us better off net of their costs by satisfying preferences
for social welfare-enhancing outcomes, even though production lies
short of the efficient frontier.107
Let us extend the first theorem to corporate production. The
adaption is quite easy: a system of corporate governance is ex ante
efficient if it generates the highest possible payoff for all the
parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, tax
authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the
corporation's actions.108 As a matter of economic theory, the
extension is completely uncontroversial, even though it sweeps in
constituent interests. To get to shareholder wealth maximization
as the purpose of the corporation, one must take two further,
assumption-laden steps.
The first step comes from the ur-text, Jensen and Meckling,
and requires us to unpack some assumptions. Jensen and Meckling
posited that if the firm is modeled as a nexus of complete contracts
among all parties involved except for the contract between a firm
and its shareholders, which is modeled as incomplete, then
maximization of shareholder value is tantamount to the
economically efficient result.109 This assertion is literally true—if
everybody other than one incomplete contract holder has a
complete maximizing contract, then everybody other than the one
incomplete contract claimant is already maxed out, and

107. See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (“The general theorem for the second best
optimum states that if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a
constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the
other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer
desirable.”).
108. See Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 8 (ECGI
Finance, Working paper No. 02/2002, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abs=343461 (“[A]
corporate charter is ex-ante efficient if it generates the highest possible joint
payoff for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, tax
authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the corporation’s
actions.”).
109. See id. at 8–9 (“[O]nly shareholders have a claim on residual returns
after all other contractual obligations have been met . . . .”). Agency costs are
assumed away. See id. at 9 (“Under this scenario, corporate governance rules
should be designed to protect and promote the interests of shareholders
exclusively.”).
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maximizing for the remaining claimant is economically efficient by
definition.
It is worth noting that economic theory here opens a door for
proponents of constituency interests to advance efficiency claims.
All they have to do is point out that other constituents have
incomplete contracts too, an assertion that is manifestly correct.
This creates a problem for shareholder proponents, for they have
to show that other constituent incompleteness does not disable
their case. This theoretical burden is addressed with a trio of
assertions: first, relatively speaking shareholders are more
vulnerable than are other stakeholders;110 second, decision-making
costs should be minimized and a multi-constituent model imports
incoherence, adding to decision-making costs;111 and third, the
shareholder interest is the residual interest and thus provides a
superior management reference point.112
If one accepts these arguments (an admittedly big “if”), then
shareholder maximization is confirmed as the firm’s theoretical
objective function. But the framework of analysis is limited. All we
are talking about is economic efficiency—that is, reaching the
production possibility frontier. Social welfare is not implicated.
Can one still say that managing to maximize shareholder
value proxies for social welfare? A lot of people do just that.113 In
fact, some avoid inserting the “proxy” qualification and casually
assume identity between shareholder value maximization and
social welfare maximization. But the proposition is theoretically
perverse either way. One suspects that the proponents are
jockeying into position for the follow up discussion about
110. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210
(1984) (“Some managements, however, play ‘end games’ (undisclosed strategic
decisions to cut and run before corrective measures can be taken) and individual
managers commonly disclose information selectively or distort data. Additional
checks against such concealment and distortion can be devised to give
shareholders greater confidence.”).
111. See Becht et al., supra note 108, at 9 (“In his view, determining which
constituency should govern the firm comes down to identifying which has the
lowest decision making costs and which has the greatest need of protection.”).
112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 449 (“[I]n most
circumstances, the interests of equity investors in the firm—the firm’s residual
claimants—cannot adequately be protected by contract. Rather, to protect their
interests, they must be given the right to control the firm.”).
113. No names will be mentioned.
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shareholder value maximization’s political economic implications.
A social welfare characterization imports political legitimacy to
deregulatory claims and policies that enhance market controls.
Indeed, to the extent that economic efficiency and social welfare
maximization are deemed equivalent, redistributive discussion is
pretermitted altogether. Such habits of mind are unsurprising in
an age in which economic disparities are widening.
The socio-economic status of shareholders has no relevance in
this efficiency discussion. Things change once the topic shifts to
social welfare, which is about distribution rather than production.
Berle’s assertion that the shareholder interest can proxy for the
public interest only when all Americans hold shares114 returns to
challenge shareholder proponents. They respond with their second
claim.
The second claim posits that the shareholder population has
been democratized as an incident of the proliferation of retirement
savings. The focal point showing is a 2005 study from the
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry
Association.115 The study showed that one-half of all U.S.
households now directly or indirectly own equities, up from about
one-fifth in 1983.116 They further reported that 90% of
equity-owning households invest in stock mutual funds and nearly
half own individual stock directly.117 They add that the
householders are virtuous shareholders, buying and holding their
stock for the long term.118 The householders “typically” own stock
and funds worth $65,000, representing “more than half” of their
total “financial assets.”119 Their median age is relatively young,
114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (considering a hypothetical
distributive utopia).
115. INVESTMENT CO. INST. & SECURITY INDUS. ASS’N., EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN
AMERICA, 2005 (2005). The report summarizes results of a survey conducted by
the Boston Research Group in January 2005. See id. at 39 (“The survey collected
detailed information on individual stock and stock mutual fund ownership inside
and outside employer-sponsored retirement plans.”).
116. See id. at 1 (“The number of households owning equities has increased
more than three-fold since the early 1980s.”).
117. See id. (demonstrating this assertion via graph labeled Figure 1).
118. See id. at 4 (“As in past years, nearly all equity owners in 2005 follow a
buy-and-hold investment philosophy and view their equity holdings as long-term
investments.”).
119. Id. More than 40% held stock or stock mutual funds through IRAs; and
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fifty-one years, and only 56% of the group graduated from
college.120 It is a pretty picture.
The statistics have been selected with care, however. The
Federal Reserve Board’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances
provides a more complete picture. The 2013 Survey shows that the
top 10% of households by wealth class owned 81.4% of the stock,
with the top one percent owning 37.8%.121 If we look at the
shareholdings of the top 10% wealth class across time, there is
some evidence of flattening.122 In 1983 the top 10% owned 89% of
the stock, a proportion that dropped to 81% by 1989, the same 81%
that obtained in 2013, and also, within a narrow band of
fluctuation, in the intervening years.123 Extrapolating, movement
to defined contribution plans did democratize shareholding, but
only slightly and with an effect that completely worked itself
through the economy before 1990.
Summarizing, shareholder value does not proxy for social
welfare and no progress in that direction has registered during the
shareholder value era.
V. The Present Posture
The scope of corporate legal theory’s mainstream discussion
has narrowed steadily since Berle’s day. He integrated the
corporation in an overall political economy in which corporations
played role in both production and allocation. Today, we only worry
nearly 90% held some or all of their equities in tax-deferred accounts. Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 5. A subsequent study tracking equity and bond ownership
appeared in 2008 from the same two organizations. This shows some deterioration
in the numbers: equity-owning householders grew to 53% in the peak year of 2001
but then declined to 45% in 2008. INVESTMENT CO. INST. & SEC’S INDUS. & FIN.
MKT. ASSOC., EQUITY AND BONDS OWNERSHIP, 2008, 7 (2008). The explanation lay
to some extent with participation in defined contribution pension plans. It seems
that a period of employer-by-employer pension fund expansion ended after 2000.
Once the saturation point was reached, a disinclination to participate on the part
of younger employees began to effect overall ownership numbers. Reverses in the
equity markets filled out the explanation. Id. at 11.
121. Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–
2013: What Happened Over the Great Recession?, 56 tbl.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20733, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20733.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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about production. This is nobody’s fault. Corporate law follows
from and reflects the national social settlement.
Today’s corporate legal theory centers on a small-scale policy
discussion about the balance of power between shareholders and
managers. Most participants obsess on excess, embedded agency
costs, and model shareholders as a permanently disadvantaged
group with an outstanding, unmet regulatory entitlement. It is a
picture that resonates less and less, for the central trend since
1990 has been progressive agency cost reduction at the instance of
market forces—just what Jensen and Meckling predicted.124 With
the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the shareholders
decisively won their battle with management between 1985 and
1990, and did so without a significant regulatory assist.
This is where corporate law is going to stay, absent a negative
external shock that upends the social settlement. We did have a
negative shock in 2008, but not enough of one to jolt the social
settlement. It was, in retrospect, just a blip on the screen. There is
a standing concern about unproductive short-termism, triggered
by the activities of activist hedge funds. But there is no compelling
evidence from practice to back up the claim of a systematic crimp
on productivity. Shareholder power certainly can have negative
effects on going concerns, but they show up company by company
rather than systemically, just as do agency costs.
If anything, the scope of corporate legal theory will narrow
even more. The days of a separation of ownership and control as
an over-arching political economic problem that corporate law
needs to solve are over. If shareholder empowerment is here to stay
and will not turn out to have systematic perverse effects (more
admittedly big “ifs”), shareholder-management relations will fall
back from the policy margin to become a field in which decisionmaking is customarily left to the business judgments of parties
with direct stakes. Corporate law will become a field in which the
basic assumption is that private ordering confronts the problems
and effects any needed changes. The public coloration will fade so
much that corporate law will look more and more like the rest of
private law, a platform on which parties capable of self-protection
124. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 675–88 (“Our challenge follows
from the lesson Jensen and Meckling taught in their classic work on agency costs:
institutions change in response to market incentives.”).
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bargain over outcomes. We made up our collective mind during the
1980s to forget about the externalities the bargaining parties
inflict along the way. But for a passing concern with externalities
inflicted by financial companies in 2008 and the years thereafter,
we maintained that posture ever since.
Should a future shift in the national social settlement rouse us
from this collective amnesia, the writings of Lyman Johnson and
David Millon will be there to facilitate restoration.

